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Abstract
We consider the classic problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods among agents with additive
valuation functions and explore the connection between two prominent fairness notions: maximum
Nash welfare (MNW) and envy-freeness up to any good (EFX). We establish that an MNW allocation
is always EFX as long as there are at most two possible values for the goods, whereas this implication
is no longer true for three or more distinct values. As a notable consequence, this proves the exis-
tence of EFX allocations for these restricted valuation functions. While the efficient computation of
an MNW allocation for two possible values remains an open problem, we present a novel algorithm
for directly constructing EFX allocations in this seing. Finally, we study the question of whether an
MNW allocation implies any EFX guarantee for general additive valuation functions under a natural
new interpretation of approximate EFX allocations.
1 Introduction
Fair division refers to the general problem of allocating a set of resources to a set of agents in a way satisfy-
ing a desired fairness criterion. Awell-known example of such a criterion is envy-freeness [Gamow and Stern,
1958; Foley, 1967; Varian, 1974], where each agent perceives the share she receives to be no worse than
what any other agent receives. Since the problem was formally introduced by Banach, Knaster and Stein-
haus [Steinhaus, 1948], fair division has aracted the aention of various scientific disciplines, including
mathematics, economics, and political science. During the last two decades, the algorithmic aspects of fair
division have been the focus of a particularly active line of work within the computer science community,
e.g., see [Procaccia, 2016; Bouveret et al., 2016; Markakis, 2017] and references therein.
We consider the classic seing where the resources are indivisible goods that need to be fully allocated
and the agents have additive valuation functions. One of the main challenges in this seing is that classic
fairness notions such as equitability, envy-freeness and proportionality—introduced several decades ago
having divisible resources in mind—are impossible to satisfy. To see this for envy-freeness, it suffices to
consider two agents and one good of value; the agent who does not get the good is going to be envious.
∗ is work has been partially supported by the ERC Advanced Grant 788893 AMDROMA “Algorithmic and Mechanism
Design Research in Online Markets”, the MIUR PRIN project ALGADIMAR “Algorithms, Games, and Digital Markets”, the ERC
Starting Grant 639945 ACCORD “Algorithms for Complex Collective Decisions on Structured Domains”, and an EPSRC doctoral
studentship (Reference 1892947). We would like to thank Ioannis Caragiannis for fruitful discussions at early stages of this work.
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is has led to the recent emergence of several weaker fairness notions (see Related work). As a result,
there is a plethora of open questions about the existence, the computation and the interrelationships of
such notions. In this work we focus on two of the most prominent: envy-freeness up to any good (EFX)
and maximum Nash welfare (MNW).
EFX, introduced recently by Caragiannis et al. [2019b], is an additive relaxation of envy-freeness. Here
an agent may envy another agent but only by the value of the least desirable good in the other agent’s
bundle. While this added flexibility of EFX takes care of extreme pathological cases like the one mentioned
above (2 agents, 1 good), this notion is not well understood yet. Despite the active interest in it, it is not
known whether EFX allocations always exist, even for 3 agents with additive valuation functions. We
consider the problem of proving (or disproving) the existence of EFX allocations to be one of the most
intriguing currently open questions in fair division.
e Nash social welfare (or, simply, Nash welfare) is the geometric mean of the agents’ utilities. By
considering maximum Nash welfare (MNW) allocations, i.e., allocations that maximize the product of
the utilities, we achieve some kind of balance between the efficiency of the maximum utilitarian social
welfare—the sum of the utilities—and the individual fairness of the maximum egalitarian social welfare—
the minimum utility. Although not a fairness concept per se, MNW has strong ties to fairness. In the
seing where the goods are divisible, each (possibly fractional) MNW allocation corresponds to a com-
petitive equilibrium from equal incomes, a market equilibrium (under the assumption that all agents are
endowed with the same budget) that is known to guarantee envy-freeness and Pareto optimality [Varian,
1974]. Even in our seing, Caragiannis et al. [2019b] showed that integral MNW allocations, besides being
Pareto optimal, are envy-free up to one good (EF1) and approximately satisfymaximin share fairness up to a
Θ(1/
√
n) factor. Both these guarantees are significantly weaker than EFX, in the sense that they are both
implied by EFX but they do not imply any approximation of it.
In general, MNW does not imply EFX. One of our goals is to identify the cases where it does, in terms
of the allowed number of distinct values for the goods. For such cases, we immediately obtain that EFX
allocations must exist and then investigate how to efficiently compute them, either through maximizing
the Nash welfare or directly. Since, in general, MNW does not even imply a non-trivial approximation
of EFX, we further introduce a less stringent, yet natural, new interpretation of approximate EFX and
investigate how it is related to MNW.
1.1 Our contribution
ere are two variants of EFX used in the related literature, depending on whether only the positively val-
ued goods are considered or not; for the laer case we adopt the name EFX0 suggested by Kyropoulou et al.
[2019]. We start by establishing a strong algorithmic connection between the two variants (Proposition
2.3). en we explore the relationship between maximizing the Nash welfare and achieving EFX or EFX0
allocations. In doing so, we also obtain some interesting results for the individual notions. In particular:
• In case there are at most two possible values for the goods (2-value instances), we show that any
allocation that maximizes the Nash welfare is EFX0 (eorem 3.2). is has the following two con-
sequences:
– For any 2-value instance, there exists an EFX0 allocation. Note that this is the first such exis-
tence result for non-identical valuations that holds for any number of agents and goods.
– For the special case of binary valuations, by adapting an algorithm of Barman et al. [2018c],
we can efficiently construct an allocation that is both MNW and EFX0.
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Note that the implication MNW⇒ EFX0 is no longer true for three or more distinct values.
• While for general 2-value instances the efficient computation of an MNW allocation remains an
open problem, we propose a polynomial-time algorithm for producing EFX0 allocations in this case
(eorem 4.1). is algorithm, which we call Match&Freeze, is based on repeatedly computing
maximummatchings and “freezing” certain agents whenever they acquire too much value compared
to their peers. We believe these novel ideas might be a stepping stone for proving the existence of
EFX allocations in more general seings.
• We also show that the difficulty of computing EFX allocations does not depend solely on the dif-
ferent number of values, but also on the ratio between the maximum and the minimum value. In
particular, for instances where the values of the agents lie in an interval such that the ratio between
the maximum and the minimum value is at most 2, we can compute an EFX allocation using a simple
variation of the well-known round-robin algorithm (eorem 4.4).
• For general additive valuations, we show that anMNW allocation does not guarantee any non-trivial
approximation of EFX. However, we argue that the current definition of approximate EFX allocations
is not always meaningful. Instead, we explore a different natural definition based on the idea of
(hypothetically) augmenting an agent’s bundle until an EFX-like condition is satisfied. For this new
benchmark, which we call EFX-value, we show that any MNW allocation is a 1/2-approximation of
EFX (eorem 5.5).
1.2 Related work
As there is a vast literature on fair division, here we focus on the indivisible items seing and on re-
lated fairness notions. e concept of envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) was implicitly suggested by
Lipton et al. [2004] and formally defined by Budish [2011]. Budish [2011] also introduced the notion of
maximin share (MMS), which has been studied extensively [Kurokawa et al., 2018; Amanatidis et al., 2017;
Barman and Murthy, 2017; Garg et al., 2019; Ghodsi et al., 2018; Garg and Taki, 2019] and has yielded sev-
eral very interesting variants like pairwiseMMS Caragiannis et al. [2019b], groupwiseMMS [Barman et al.,
2018a], and MMS for groups of agents Suksompong [2018].
As already mentioned, EFX was introduced by Caragiannis et al. [2019b]. Plaut and Roughgarden
[2018] defined what an α-approximate EFX (or α-EFX) allocation is and studied exact and approximate
EFX allocations with both additive and general valuations. Most of their results, including the existence of
EFX allocations for identical valuations, hold under the similar but stricter notion of EFX0 which is implic-
itly introduced therein. e currently best 0.618-approximation of either EFX or EFX0 for the additive case
is due to Amanatidis et al. [2020]. For binary additive valuations, Aleksandrov and Walsh [2019] recently
proposed an algorithm that produces EFX—but not necessarily EFX0—allocations.
Besides [Caragiannis et al., 2019b], there are several recent papers which relate allocations that max-
imize (exactly or approximately) the Nash welfare with other fairness notions. Caragiannis et al. [2019a]
showed that there exist incomplete allocations that are EFX and in which each agent receives at least half
of the value they get in a MNW allocation; Chaudhury et al. [2020] achieved the same with only a few
unallocated goods. Garg and McGlaughlin showed how to get an allocation that 2-approximates the Nash
welfare of an MNW allocation that is also proportional up to one good, satisfies a weak MMS guarantee and
is Pareto optimal.
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Since computing MNW allocations is an APX-hard problem [Lee, 2017], there is an active interest
on special cases or on approximation algorithms. Barman et al. [2018c] show how to efficiently com-
pute MNW allocations for binary additive valuation functions. Cole and Gkatzelis [2018] were the first
to obtain a constant approximation algorithm to the MNW objective. is algorithm, as shown via the
improved analysis of Cole et al. [2017], achieves a factor of 2. e currently best-known factor of 1.45 is
due to Barman et al. [2018b]. Going beyond the additive case, in a recent work Garg et al. [2020] study the
problem for submodular valuation functions.
2 Preliminaries and Notation
We consider fair division instances I = (N,M, (vi)i∈N ) in which there is a setN of n agents and a setM
ofm indivisible goods. Each agent i ∈ N has a valuation function vi : M → R≥0 assigning a non-negative
real value vi(g) to each good g ∈ M . roughout this work, vi is additive, i.e., vi(A) =
∑
g∈A vi(g) for
every set (or bundle) of goods A ⊆M . We pay particular aention to the following subclasses of additive
valuation functions:
• Binary: vi(g) ∈ {0, 1} for every i ∈ N and g ∈M ;
• k-value: there is a set V consisting of |V | = k distinct, non-negative real values such that vi(g) ∈ V
for every i ∈ N and g ∈M ;
• Interval-value: for every agent i ∈ N there exist two real non-negative numbers xi and yi such that
xi < yi, and vi(g) ∈ [xi, yi] for every g ∈M .
Of course, any binary instance is a 2-value instance with V = {0, 1}, but we distinguish between these
cases as we are able to obtain stronger algorithmic results for the binary case.
A complete allocation (or just allocation) A = (Ai)i∈N is a vector listing the bundle Ai of goods that
each agent i receives, such that Ai ∩ Aj = ∅ for every i, j ∈ N , and ∪i∈NAi = M . Our goal is to come
up with allocations that are considered to be fair by all agents. We begin by defining envy-freeness and
its additive relaxations.
Definition 2.1. An allocationA = (Ai)i∈N is
• envy-free (EF) if vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj) for every pair i, j ∈ N ;
• envy-free up to one good (EF1) if for every pair i, j ∈ N with Aj 6= ∅ there exists a good g ∈ Aj ,
such that vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj \ {g});
• envy-free up to any (positively-valued) good (EFX) if for every pair i, j ∈ N and every good g ∈ Aj
for which vi(g) > 0, it holds that vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj \ {g});
• envy-free up to any good (EFX0) if for every pair i, j ∈ N and every good g ∈ Aj , it holds that
vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj \ {g}).
By definition, we have EF ⇒ EFX0 ⇒ EFX ⇒ EF1, but no implication works in the opposite direction.
For brevity, we say that agent i is E towards agent j when the criterion of E ∈ {EF,EF1,EFX,EFX0} is
true for the ordered pair (i, j).
As mentioned in the Introduction, the Nash welfare is usually defined as the geometric mean of the val-
ues. Here, for simplicity, we use the product of the values instead. As the allocations (exactly) maximizing
the Nash welfare are the same under both definitions, this is without loss of generality.
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Definition 2.2. e Nash welfare of an allocationA = (Ai)i∈N is the product of the values of the agents
for their bundles: NW(A) =
∏
i∈N vi(Ai).
We will usually denote by A∗ one of the allocations that maximize the Nash welfare (MNW). Among
all such allocations, we will sometimes selectA∗ so that some additional properties are satisfied; e.g., see
the discussion in Section 3. Caragiannis et al. [2019b] showed that MNW⇒ EF1, but the exact connection
between MNW and the variants of EFX is not well-understood.
Before we dive into our main technical results, we show a somewhat surprising connection between
EFX and EFX0. In particular, assuming agents with k-value valuation functions, for any k ∈ N, the ques-
tion of finding an EFX0 allocation reduces to finding an EFX allocation for an instance with only slightly
perturbed valuation functions. An immediate corollary is that the existence (resp. the efficient computa-
tion) of EFX allocations for additive agents implies the existence (resp. the efficient computation) of EFX0
allocations; the converse statements are obvious.
Proposition 2.3. Let k ∈ N. e problem of computing EFX0 allocations for k-value instances reduces to
the problem of computing EFX allocations for k-value instances. When all values are rational numbers, this
reduction requires only polynomial time.
Proof. Consider any instance I = (N,M, (vi)i∈N ). Let δ be theminimumnon-zero value difference among
any two subsets of goods, according to the valuation function of any agent, that is
δ = min
i∈N
min
A,B⊆2M :
vi(A)<vi(B)
{vi(B)− vi(A)}.
Furthermore, pick an arbitrarily small ε ∈ (0, δm). Now, let I ′ = (N,M, (v˜i)i∈N ) be an instance such that
v˜i(g) =
{
vi(g), if vi(g) > 0
ε, if vi(g) = 0.
at is, I ′ is obtained from I by changing any 0 in the valuation functions of the agents to ε. Assume that
there exists an EFX allocationA for instance I ′. We will show thatA is also an EFX0 allocation for I .
Consider any pair of agents i, j ∈ N . SinceA is EFX in I ′, we have that v˜i(Ai) ≥ v˜i(Aj \ g) for every
g ∈ Aj . Let g∗ = argming∈Aj vi(g). Observe that by the choice of ε, g∗ is the one that must be ignored
when we check whetherA is EFX0 for I as well.
• If vi(g
∗) = 0, then it must be the case that vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj). Assume otherwise that vi(Ai) < vi(Aj).
en, by the definition of δ, it must be vi(Ai) ≤ vi(Aj) − δ. Using the fact that vi(Aj) = vi(Aj \
{g∗}) ≤ v˜i(Aj \ {g∗}), by our choice of ε, we have that
v˜i(Ai) ≤ vi(Ai) +mε ≤ vi(Aj)− δ +mε < v˜i(Aj \ {g∗}),
contradicting the assumption thatA is EFX in I ′. Hence, i is envy-free towards j.
• If vi(g
∗) > 0, then it must be the case that vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj \ {g∗}). As before, assume otherwise
that vi(Ai) < vi(Aj \ {g∗}) or, equivalently, vi(Ai) ≤ vi(Aj \ {g∗}) − δ. Since vi(Aj \ {g∗}) ≤
v˜i(Aj \ {g∗}), and by our choice of ε, we have that
v˜i(Ai) ≤ vi(Ai) +mε ≤ v˜i(Aj \ {g∗})− δ +mε < v˜i(Aj \ {g∗}),
again contradicting the assumption thatA is EFX in I ′. Hence, i is EFX0 towards j.
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erefore the computation of an EFX0 allocation can be reduced to computing an EFX allocation in an
instance with slightly perturbed valuation functions as above.
In case the values are rational numbers, this reduction needs only polynomial time as δ is at least 1/D,
where D is the denominator of the product of the values of all agents for all goods, and hence it suffices
to choose ε ∈ (0, 1mD ).
3 Maximum Nash Welfare: EFX and Computational Complexity
In this section we focus on allocations that maximize the Nash welfare. We first identify the subclasses
of valuation functions for which the MNW allocations are always EFX0, and then consider computational
complexity questions.
Before moving forward, we need to discuss how we handle instances with zero Nash welfare and
instances containing zero-valued goods, i.e., goods for which all agents have value 0.1
Instances with zero Nash welfare. When we talk about the MNW allocations of an instance, the stan-
dard interpretationwould be to include all complete allocationswhich achieve themaximumNashwelfare.
When it is possible to achieve positive Nash welfare this is indeed true. However, for the extreme case of
instances where all allocations have zero Nash welfare we are going to need a refinement. Following the
work of Caragiannis et al. [2019b], we call an allocation an MNW allocation if it (1) maximizes the number
of agents with positive value, and then (2) maximizes the product of the values of such agents.
e requirements (1) and (2) are by default true for MNW allocations in instances with positive Nash
welfare. ey are also necessary because when the Nash welfare is zero, the idea of maximizing it clearly
fails to distinguish “good” allocations in any sense. To illustrate this, consider the next instance:
g1 g2 g3
agent 1 1 0 0
agent 2 1 0 0
agent 3 0 1 1
Since the first two agents only like g1, the Nash welfare of any allocation is 0. However, not all allocations
are EFX0. e allocation {∅,∅, {g1, g2, g3}} is clearly not EFX0 since the first two agents envy agent 3
even aer the removal of either g2 or g3. Even an allocation such as {{g1, g2},∅, {g3}}, which maximizes
the number of agents with positive value, is not EFX0 since agent 2 envies agent 1 even aer the removal
of g2. On the other hand, the allocation {{g1},∅, {g2, g3}}, which maximizes the number of agents with
positive value as well as the product of their values, is indeed EFX0: the envy of agent 2 towards agent 1
is eliminated by the removal of g1.
Instances with zero-valued goods. While, clearly, zero-valued goods do not affect the Nash welfare of
an allocation, they do play an important role as to whether this allocation is EFX0. To allocate such goods,
we first ignore them completely, and compute a Nash welfaremaximizing partial allocationB∗ only for the
remaining goods (which are positively valued by some agent), subject to the requirements (1) and (2) in case
the Nashwelfare is zero. We then obtain the completeMNWallocationA∗ by allocating all the zero-valued
goods to one of the agents with the least value according to B∗.2 Observe that NW(A∗) = NW(B∗), by
1 Even though it seems quite natural to discard such zero-valued goods, there are seings where one cannot assume free
disposal and all goods must be allocated.
2 For the restricted valuation classes we study here, this suffices. A more general alternative way to complete the allocation
would be to allocate all the zero-valued goods to one of the agents that no one envies in B∗. It is not hard to show that in any
MNW (partial) allocation at least one such agent exists.
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definition. Allocating the zero-valued goods this way is also necessary as we illustrate next. Consider the
same example as above, but with an extra zero-valued good g4, such that:
g1 g2 g3 g4
agent 1 1 0 0 0
agent 2 1 0 0 0
agent 3 0 1 1 0
As before, all allocations have zero Nash welfare, and hence we need an allocation that satisfies (1) and
(2). e allocation ({g1, g4},∅, {g2, g3}) is indeed such an allocation: the number of agents with positive
value as well as the product of their values are maximized. However, because g4 has been given to agent
1 (who has value 1) instead of 2 (who has value 0), agent 2 envies agent 1 even aer its, and thus the
allocation is not EFX0. By moving g4 to agent 2, we obtain the allocation ({g1}, {g4}, {g2, g3}), which
maximizes the number of agents with positive value, the product of their values, and gives the all-zero
good g4 to the agent with the least value among all agents, and is indeed EFX0 as agent 1 has only one
good.
3.1 When does MNW imply EFX?
Our main result here is that for all 2-value instances any MNW allocation is also EFX0. Moreover, this
result is tight: there exist 3-value instances for which this implication is no longer true. To simplify the
presentation of our results, we distinguish between binary and general 2-value instances.
eorem 3.1. For every binary instance, any MNW allocation is EFX0.
Proof. Consider any binary instance I = (N,M, (vi)i∈N ), and let B
∗ = (Bi)i∈N be the allocation that
maximizes the Nashwelfare (bymaximizing the number of agents with positive value and then the product
of their value in case the MNW is zero) for the sub-instance I>0 consisting only of the goods which are
positively valued by some agent. en,A∗ is obtained fromB∗ by allocating the remaining goods (which
are valued as zero by all agents) to one of the agents with the least value for their own bundles.
Observe that in I>0, B
∗ must be such that all agents with positive value get goods which they value
as 1 and all agents with zero value get an empty set. Assume otherwise that some agent i gets a good g
such that vi(g) = 0. en by moving g to some agent j 6= i with vj(g) = 1 we can strictly increase either
the product of the values of the agents that have positive value or the number of agents that get positive
value, a contradiction. Hence, we have that vi(Bi) = |Bi|.
We next show that by allocating all the zero-valued goods to some agent i∗ ∈ argmini∈N vi(Bi) we
have that A∗ is EFX0 as long as B
∗ is EFX0. We distinguish between two cases depending on whether
NW(B∗) > 0 or NW(B∗) = 0.
Case I: NW(B∗) > 0.
Consider a pair of agents i and j. If ming∈Bj vi(g) = 1, then i must be EFX0 towards j since i is EF1
towards j, and the two notions coincide. So, from now on we assume that ming∈Bj vi(g) = 0. Moreover,
we assume that there exists a good in Bj that i values as 1, since otherwise i would trivially be EFX0
towards j, and hence |Bj| ≥ 2.
We will show that i is in fact envy-free towards j, and thus vi(Bi) ≥ vi(Bj). Assume towards a
contradiction that vi(Bi) < vi(Bj). Since there exists a good g ∈ Bj such that vi(g) = 0, we have that
vi(Bj) < vj(Bj). By the fact that vi(Bi) = |Bi| and vj(Bj) = |Bj |, we thus obtain that |Bj | ≥ |Bi|+ 2.
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Now, define a new allocation by moving a good in Bj that i values as 1 from j to i. e product of the
values of the two agents in the new allocation is equal to
(|Bi|+ 1)(|Bj | − 1) = |Bi||Bj |+ |Bj | − |Bi| − 1 ≥ |Bi||Bj |+ 1.
Since the bundles of the remaining agents have not changed, the new allocation has strictly higher Nash
welfare compared to B∗, a contradiction.
Case II: NW(B∗) = 0.
Consider a pair of agents i and j. If Bi = ∅ and Bj = ∅, then they are trivially envy-free towards each
other. Also, if Bi 6= ∅ and Bj 6= ∅, we can show that they are EFX0 towards each other by adapting our
arguments for the previous case. Hence, we now focus on the case whereBi = ∅ andBj 6= ∅. If |Bj | = 1,
then i is trivially EFX0 towards j. Hence, assume that |Bj| ≥ 2. We claim that maxg∈Bj vi(g) = 0, and
consequently i is envy-free towards j. Assume otherwise that there exists a good g ∈ Bj such that
vi(g) = 1. en, by moving g from j to i we can either obtain positive Nash welfare if i is the only agent
with zero value, or we can increase the number of agents with positive value in case the Nash welfare
remains equal to 0; since vj(Bj) = |Bj | ≥ 2, j still has positive value even aer losing g.
In any case, we conclude thatB∗ is EFX0, and consequentlyA
∗ is EFX0 as well.
We continue by showing that maximizing the Nash welfare yields an EFX0 allocation for all 2-value
instances. Since a 2-value instance with values a > 1 and b = 0 is equivalent to a binary instance (by
normalizing the values), eorem 3.1 above implies that we only need to focus on instances with positive
values. Note that in this case EFX0 coincides with EFX.
eorem 3.2. For any 2-value instance with positive values, any MNW allocation is EFX.
Proof. Let a > b > 0 and consider any 2-value instance I = (N,M, (vi)i∈N ) in which vi(g) ∈ {a, b} for
every i ∈ N and g ∈ M . Let i and j be any two agents who are given the sets of goods Ai and Aj in an
MNW allocationA∗. We say that a good is of type Txy if i and j have values vi(g) = x and vj(g) = y for
good g, respectively; so there are four different types of goods: Taa, Tab, Tba and Tbb. Ifming∈Aj vi(g) = a
or maxg∈Aj vi(g) = b, then i is EFX towards j since i is EF1 towards j [Caragiannis et al., 2019b] and
the two notions coincide in this case for the pair (i, j). erefore, from now on, we will assume that
ming∈Aj vi(g) = b andmaxg∈Aj vi(g) = a, which implies that |Aj | ≥ 2 andAj includes at least one good
of type Tba or Tbb.
Case I: ere is at least one good of type Tbb in Aj .
Subcase (a): Aj does not include any good of type Tab. Assume, towards a contradiction, that i is not EFX
towards j: vi(Ai) < vi(Aj) − b. Since vj(g) ≥ vi(g) for all g ∈ Aj , we have that vj(Aj) ≥ vi(Aj). We
now define a new allocation by moving a good h ∈ Aj of type Tbb from j to i. In this new allocation, the
product of the values of i and j is
(vi(Ai) + b)(vj(Aj)− b) = vi(Ai)vj(Aj) + b(vj(Aj)− vi(Ai)− b)
≥ vi(Ai)vj(Aj) + b(vi(Aj)− vi(Ai)− b)
> vi(Ai)vj(Aj).
Since the allocation of all other agents has not been changed, the new allocation achieves a strictly larger
Nash welfare thanA∗, yielding a contradiction.
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Subcase (b): Aj includes at least one good g of type Tab. We will argue about the structure of set Ai. If Ai
includes any good x of type Taa, Tba or Tbb, then by exchanging g with x, we obtain an allocation with
strictly higher Nash welfare, contradicting the choice of A∗. For example, if x is of type Taa, then in the
new allocation (aer swapping x and g) agent i has exactly the same value, but agent j’s value has strictly
increased by an amount a− b > 0. One can verify that the same holds for the other two types. Hence, Ai
must include only goods of type Tab, which implies that vi(Ai) = |Ai|a.
Towards a contradiction, assume that i is not EFX towards j. If |Aj | ≤ |Ai| + 1, since Aj includes
some good h for which vi(h) = b, we have that
vi(Aj) ≤ (|Aj | − 1)a+ b ≤ |Ai|a+ b = vi(Ai) + b,
i.e., agent i is EFX towards j. So, it must be |Aj | ≥ |Ai|+2. We create a new allocation by moving a good
g ∈ Tab from j to i. e product of the values of i and j then becomes
(vi(Ai) + a)(vj(Aj)− b) = vi(Ai)vj(Aj) + avj(Aj)− bvi(Ai)− ab.
Since vj(Aj) ≥ |Aj |b ≥ (|Ai|+ 2)b and vi(Ai) = |Ai|a, we have that
avj(Aj)− bvi(Ai)− ab ≥ (|Ai|+ 2)ab − |Ai|ab− ab = ab > 0.
Since the bundles of the other agents have not been changed, we have that the new allocation has strictly
larger Nash welfare thanA∗, contradicting its choice.
Case II: ere are no goods of type Tbb in Aj .
en Aj includes at least one good of type Tba. If Aj includes at least one good of type Tab, then, as we
argued in Case I(b) above, in order for A∗ to be an MNW allocation, Ai cannot include any goods of type
Taa, Tba or Tbb. As a result, Ai includes only goods of type Tab and by reproducing the analysis used in
Case I(b) it follows thatA∗ is EFX.
So, we may assume thatAj includes goods of type Tba and Taa only. is implies that vj(Aj) = |Aj |a.
Assume towards a contradiction that i is not EFX towards j: vi(Ai) < vi(Aj) − b. Since Aj contains at
least one good that i values as b, we also have that vi(Aj) ≤ (|Aj | − 1)a + b. Combining the last two
expressions, we obtain that
vi(Ai) + a < |Aj |a = vj(Aj).
Now, consider the allocation that is obtained fromA∗ by moving a good of type Taa from j to i. We know
that such an item exists since maxg∈Aj vi(g) = a. By using the last inequality, the product of the values
of i and j in the new allocation is
(vi(Ai) + a)(vj(Aj)− a) = vi(Ai)vj(Aj) + a(vj(Aj)− vi(Ai)− a)
> vi(Ai)vj(Aj),
which combined with the fact that the bundles of the other agents have not been changed, contradicts the
choice ofA∗.
In any case, we conclude thatA∗ must be EFX.
Caragiannis et al. [2019a] presented a 3-value instance in which no MNW allocation is EFX. For com-
pleteness, we include here a simpler such instance, which further shows that the implication MNW ⇒
{EFX,EFX0} is no longer true even for interval-value instances in which the length of the interval is al-
most zero. Let ε be a small positive constant and consider an instance with two agents and three goods
with values as shown in in the table:
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g1 g2 g3
agent 1 1− ε 1 1 + ε
agent 2 1 1− ε 1 + ε
is is a 3-value instance with values {1 − ε, 1, 1 + ε}. Clearly, it is also an interval-value instance with
interval of length 2ε, which can be arbitrarily close to zero by selecting ε to be extremely small. It is easy
to verify that there are exactly two allocations achieving the maximum Nash welfare of 2 + ε: A1 =
({g2}, {g1, g3}) andA2 = ({g2, g3}, {g1}). e Nash welfare of any other allocation is either 2(1− ε) or
2 + ε − ε2. Now, for ℓ ∈ {1, 2}, observe that in Aℓ agent ℓ is not EFX towards the other agent since she
envies her even aer the removal of gℓ.
3.2 On the complexity of maximizing the Nash welfare
We now turn our aention to the complexity of computing a maximum Nash welfare allocation. is
problem is already known to be hard for many domain restrictions, and easy for only a few special cases.
Nevertheless, its complexity for k-value instances with k ∈ {2, 3, 4} has been open. Here we make signif-
icant progress towards seling these cases. We again start with the binary case.
eorem 3.3. For binary instances, computing an MNW allocation (and thus an EFX0 allocation) can be
done in polynomial time.
Proof. Consider any binary instance I = (N,M, (vi)i∈N ) and let I>0 be the sub-instance consisting only
of the goods that are positively valued by some agent. Given the MNW allocation B∗ for I>0, we can
obtain the MNW allocationA∗ for I by augmentingB∗ so that all the zero-valued goods are given to the
agent with minimum value according toB∗. So, it remains to compute B∗ in I>0.
To do this, we use the greedy algorithm Alg-Binary of Barman et al. [2018c] which outputs an al-
location maximizing the Nash welfare for the binary instance. Let B be the allocation that Alg-Binary
outputs when given as input I>0. If NW(B) > 0, then B
∗ = B is also EFX0 by eorem 3.1. However, if
NW(B) = 0, in which case all allocations have zero Nash welfare,B might not be an MNW allocation in
our sense, i.e., an allocation that maximizes the number of agents with positive value and then the product
of their values. Hence, B may not be EFX0. To circumvent this, we define a bipartite graph consisting of
nodes corresponding to the agents on the le and nodes corresponding to the goods on the right, while an
edge between an agent and a good exists if the agent has value 1 for the good. By computing a maximum
bipartite matching on this graph, it is guaranteed that the number of agents with positive value is maxi-
mized. en, we run Alg-Binary on the restricted sub-instance of I>0 where the set of agents includes
only the ones that participate in the maximummatching, so that the product of their values (which now is
going to be positive) is also maximized. is yields the desired allocationB∗ with maximum Nash welfare
for I>0 in which the agents that did not participate in the maximum matching get an empty set.
For general 2-value instances we were unable to resolve the complexity of computing an MNW allo-
cation, but we show that the problem is NP-hard for 3-value instances. is extends the hardness aspect
(but not the inapproximability) of the result of Lee [2017] for 5-value instances.
eorem 3.4. Computing an MNW allocation is NP-hard, even for 3-value instances.
Proof. We will prove that the problem of deciding whether there exists an allocation that achieves Nash
welfare at least some value U is NP-complete. Given an allocation, it is trivial to check whether its Nash
welfare is at least U . For the hardness, we give a reduction from a special version of 3SAT, known as
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2P2N-3SAT, where every variable appears twice as a positive literal and twice as a negative literal. is
problem is known to be NP-complete [Yoshinaka, 2005; Berman et al., 2003].
Consider an instance of 2P2N-3SAT, in which the set of variables is {x1, . . . , xn}, and the set of clauses
is {C1, . . . , Cm}. We will now describe how to construct a 3-value instance with 2m + 5n goods and
3m+ 2n agents, where the set of values V consists of a, b = 1 and c = 0, where a > 1/( 2m
√
2− 1).
For each variable xi, introduce two variable-agents {Ti, Fi}, as well as 5 variable-goods, denoted as
{si,0, si,1, si,2, si,3, si,4}. e values of the variable-agents for the variable-goods are:
• si,0: both Ti and Fi have value a for it; the value of all other variable-agents is 0.
• si,1 and si,2: Ti has value 1 for each of them; the value of all other variable-agents is 0.
• si,3 and si,4: Fi has value 1 for each of them; the value of all other variable-agents is 0.
For each clause Cj = (ℓ1 ∨ ℓ2 ∨ ℓ3), where ℓ1, ℓ2 and ℓ3 are the three literals in the clause, introduce
three clause-agents {C1j , C2j , C3j } and two clause-goods {pj , qj}. e values of the clause-agents for all
goods as well as the values of the variable-agents for the clause-goods are as follows:
• Both pj and qj are valued as a by the three corresponding clause-agents C
1
j , C
2
j and C
3
j , and as 0 by
all other (variable- and clause-) agents.
• For every j, the clause-agent Ctj , t ∈ [3] has value 0 for all other goods, besides one:
– If ℓt = xi, then C
t
j has value 1 for one of two variable-goods si,1, si,2 (whichever is not valued
by some other clause-agent).
– If ℓt = xi, then C
t
j has value 1 for one of the two variable-goods si,3, si,4 (whichever is not
valued by some other clause-agent).
Note that since there are exactly two occurrences of xi and xi in the 2P2N-3SAT instance, each of the
variable-goods si,1, si,2, si,3, si,4 is valued by exactly two agents (and one of them is always Ti or Fi).
Given a satisfying assignment for the 2P2N-3SAT instance, we define the following allocation with
Nash welfare at least U = 2na2m+n:
• Variables: If xi = 1, then we allocate si,0 to Ti (for value a) and {si,3, si,4} to Fi (for value 2).
Otherwise (xi = 0), we allocate si,0 to Fi (for value a) and {si,1, si,2} to Ti (for value 2).
• Clauses: Let Cj = (ℓ1 ∨ ℓ2 ∨ ℓ3). Since Cj is satisfied, at least one of ℓ1, ℓ2 or ℓ3 is true; without loss
of generality, assume that ℓ1 is true. en, we allocate pj to C
2
j (for value a), and qj to C
3
j (again for
value a). Note that there is now exactly one good valued by C1j that is still unallocated. If ℓ1 = xi,
then this good is one of si,1 or si,2, while if ℓ1 = xi, then this good is one of si,3 or si,4. In any case,
we allocate this good to C1j .
• We allocate any remaining goods arbitrarily.
Nowobserve that for any variablexi the product of the values of the two variable-agentsTi andFi is at least
2a, and for any clauseCj = (ℓ1∨ℓ2∨ℓ3) the product of the values of the three clause-agentsC1j ,C2j andC3j
is at least a2. Consequently, the Nash welfare of the resulting allocation is at least (2a)n(a2)m = 2na2m+n.
Conversely, we will now show that given any allocation with Nash welfare at least 2na2m+n, we can
obtain a satisfying assignment for the 2P2N-3SAT instance. Without loss of generality, we can assume that
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every good has been allocated to some agent that has positive value for it. Otherwise, we can modify the
allocation so that this holds and the Nash welfare will not decrease. In particular, in any clause Cj , the
goods pj and qj will be allocated to the agents C
1
j , C
2
j , C
3
j .
More specifically, we can assume that pj and qj have been allocated to distinct clause-agents. Suppose
otherwise that pj and qj have both been allocated to the same agent, say C
1
j . If one of C
2
j or C
3
j has value
0 (and hence the Nash welfare is 0), then by allocating qj to that agent instead the Nash welfare will not
decrease. If both C2j and C
3
j have positive value, then this must be equal to 1. Reallocating qj to (say)
C2j will not decrease the Nash welfare. Indeed, before the modification the product of values was at most
2a+1 and aer it is at least a(a+1). By our choice of a, we have 2a+1 ≤ a(a+1), so the Nash welfare
cannot decrease as a result of this modification.
By the observation above, we can assume that si,0 has been allocated to Ti orFi. If it has been allocated
to Ti, then we can also assume that goods si,1 and si,2 have not been allocated to Ti, but instead that they
have each been allocated to the unique other agent that values them. Let us show this for si,1 (the other
case is identical). Assume that si,1 has been allocated to Ti and letC
t
j be the unique other agent that values
it. By the above discussion, Ctj has obtained at most one of pj and qj . If C
t
j has value 0, it is easy to see
that allocating si,1 to C
t
j does not decrease the Nash welfare. If C
t
j has positive value, then this must be
equal to a. Now if Ti has utility a+2, then by allocating si,1 to C
t
j instead, the product of values increases
from (a+ 2)a to (a+ 1)2. On the other hand, if Ti has utility a+ 1, then by allocating si,1 to C
t
j instead,
the product of values remains the same (it goes from (a+1)a to a(a+1)). Similarly, if good si,0 has been
allocated to Fi, we can assume that goods si,3 and si,4 have not been allocated to Ti, but instead that they
have each been allocated to the unique other agent that values them.
We now construct an assignment for the variables as follows:
• If Ti has obtained si,0, then we set xi = 1.
• If Fi has obtained si,0, then we set xi = 0.
We say that the allocation satisfies the consistency property, if the agent in {Ti, Fi} that has not obtained
si,0, has obtained all other goods which she values for a total value of 2.
Let us first show that if the allocation satisfies the consistency property, the assignment satisfies the
2P2N-3SAT instance. Observe that for every clauseCj , one of the three agentsC
1
j ,C
2
j orC
3
j will not obtain
one of the two clause-goods which they all value as a. us, this agent has to obtain the single other
variable-good which she positively values, otherwise the Nash welfare would be 0. By the consistency
property, it follows that the literal associated to this agent must be satisfied. us, the clause is satisfied.
Finally, let us show that if the Nash welfare of the allocation is at least 2na2m+n, then the consistency
property holds. Assume that there exists an i such that the agent in {Ti, Fi} that has not obtained si,0,
has value strictly less than 2, i.e. at most 1. us, the product of the values of Ti and Fi is at most a. For
any other i′, the product of the values of Ti′ and Fi′ is at most 2a. For any clause Cj , the product of the
values of the three corresponding clause-agents is at most (a + 1)2. us, altogether the Nash welfare is
at most (a + 1)2m(2a)n−1a = 2n−1(a + 1)2man. By our choice of a > 1/( 2m
√
2 − 1), we have ensured
that (a+ 1)2m < 2a2m, and so the Nash welfare is indeed strictly less than 2na2m+n.
4 Computing EFX Allocations for Restricted Domains
Even though we showed that any MNW allocation is also EFX0 for agents with 2-value valuation func-
tions, it remains an open question whether there exists a polynomial-time algorithm for computing such
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allocations beyond the binary case. In this section, we try to circumvent this and aim to design efficient
algorithms for computing EFX0 allocations (which might not maximize the Nash welfare) for 2-value in-
stances and interval-value instances.
4.1 2-value instances
We begin with considering 2-value instances with values {a, b} such that a > b ≥ 0. Our algorithm, which
we call Match&Freeze, proceeds in rounds and maintains a set of active agents L, initially containing
everyone. In each round, every active agent is given exactly one of the remaining goods, with the possible
exception of the last round in which there might not be enough goods le for all agents. e algorithm
terminates when all goods have been allocated.
Algorithm 1 Match&Freeze(N,M, (vi)i∈N )
1: Input: a 2-value instance using the values a, b (a > b ≥ 0)
2: L← N ⊲ set of active agents
3: R←M ⊲ set of unallocated goods
4: ℓ = (1, 2, . . . , n) ⊲ ordered list of agents
5: while R 6= ∅ do ⊲ every iteration is a round
6: Construct the bipartite graph G = (L ∪R,E).
7: Compute a maximum matching on G.
8: for each matched pair (i, g) do
9: Allocate good g to agent i.
10: Remove g from R.
11: for each unmatched active agent i w.r.t. ℓ do
12: Allocate one arbitrary unallocated good g to i.
13: Remove g from R.
14: Construct the set F of agents that need to freeze.
15: Remove agents of F from L for the next ⌊a/b− 1⌋ rounds.
16: Put agents of F to the end of ℓ.
17: return the resulting allocationA.
To determine which good each active agent gets during a round, we create a bipartite graph G =
(L∪R,E) with nodes corresponding to the active agents L on one side and to the remaining goodsR on
the other. An edge between an active agent i and a good g exists if and only if vi(g) = a. We first compute
a maximum matching on this graph. en each agent gets the good to which she is matched. If there are
agents who are not matched to any good and there are still available goods, the unmatched agents receive
one arbitrary available good each (subject to availability).
ere are two possible reasons why an agent i is not matched to any good in a round: (1) she does not
have value a for any good (only b), or (2) the maximummatching is such that all goods for which her value
is a are given to other agents. Case (1) does not affect whether the final allocation will be EFX0, but case
(2) is crucial. is is because agent i might now have much smaller value for her own bundle compared
to her value for the bundles of some agents that just received one good each that i values as a. Let Z be
the set of these agents. To make up the distance, agent i should possibly receive multiple goods of value b
while all agents in Z must freeze for a number of subsequent rounds depending on the ratio a/b.
We define the set F of agents that need to freeze at the end of round r to consist of all those agents who
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must become inactive because they have obtained too much value from the perspective of other agents
(similarly to Case (2) above). Formally, for every active agent i, let gi be the good she gets in round r. We
begin by seing F = {i ∈ L | ∃j ∈ L : vj(gi) = a, vj(gj) = b}. en, iteratively, as long as there is an
agent i ∈ L \ F such that there exists j ∈ F with vj(gi) = a, we also add i to F . Each agent in F will
remain frozen for the next ⌊a/b−1⌋ rounds. In the case b = 0, we use the interpretation ⌊a/b−1⌋ = +∞
in which case agents in F remain frozen forever. Exploiting the properties of the maximum matchings
used to allocate goods we can prove that no agent in F will become envious while frozen, and that F is
always a strict subset of L. e laer means that there is at least one (non-frozen) active agent at any time,
and thus the algorithm will terminate aer at mostm rounds.
eorem 4.1. For any 2-value instance, Match&Freeze computes an EFX0 allocation in polynomial time.
Proof. Let A = (Ai)i∈N be the allocation outpued by Match&Freeze when given as input a 2-value
instance I = (N,M, (vi)i∈N ) such that vi(g) ∈ {a, b}, a > b ≥ 0, for every i ∈ N and g ∈ M . For any
agent i, let ri be the round in which the last goods of value a for agent i were allocated. We will need the
following two lemmas.
Lemma 4.2. For every agent i, it holds that:
• She was allocated a good for which she has value a in each of the rounds 1, 2, . . . , ri − 1.
• She can freeze only at the end of round ri, and only if during that round she got a good for which she
has value a.
• She can freeze at most once. Aer freezing, she has value b for each of the remaining goods.
Proof of Lemma 4.2. For the first part of the lemma, assume that agent i was allocated a good she values
as b in some round r < ri. is would mean that agent i was le unmatched in round r. However, in
round ri > r there were still goods that i values as a available. Consequently, agent i could also have been
matched in round r, which means that we did not use a maximum matching, a contradiction.
For the second and third part of the lemma, consider an agent i that got frozen at the end of some round
r. Since agent i = i0 got frozen, there exist distinct agents i1, . . . , ik (k ≤ n) such that viℓ(giℓ−1) = a
for ℓ ∈ [k], and vik(gik) = b. Note that agent ik was not matched in round r. Let us now show that the
following cases are impossible:
• vi(gi) = b. is means that agent i = i0 was also not matched in round r, and out of the agents
i0, . . . , ik at most k − 1 were matched in round r. However, since viℓ(giℓ−1) = a for every ℓ ∈ [k],
we could match agent iℓ to good gℓ−1, and obtain a matching of size k rather than at most k − 1, a
contradiction. erefore, it must be vi(gi) = a.
• r > ri. By the definition of ri, agent i must have been allocated a good she values as b in round r,
which is impossible as we showed above. Hence, it must be r ≤ ri.
• r < ri. By the definition of ri, at the end of round r there exists an unallocated good g
∗ such that
vi(g
∗) = a. Since vik(gik) = b, k of the agents i0, . . . , ik were matched in round r. However, by
matching agent iℓ to good gℓ−1 for each ℓ ∈ [k], and i = i0 to g∗, we can obtain a larger matching
of size k + 1 rather than k, a contradiction. erefore, it must be r ≥ ri.
By the last two cases, we have that agent i can only get frozen in round r = ri, and by the definition of ri,
the value of i for any of the remaining goods is b.
14
Lemma 4.3. If at the beginning of some round r > ri, an active agent i is envy-free towards agent j, then
agent i will be EFX0 towards agent j at the end of the algorithm.
Proof of Lemma 4.3. By the second part of Lemma 4.2, agent i is active during all rounds aer r > ri
until the end of the algorithm, and i has value b for all remaining goods. Consequently, agent i will be
allocated a good she values as b in each subsequent round, except potentially the last round (during which
she may not get any good), while the value of i for the bundle of agent j can increase by at most b in each
subsequent round as well. Consequently, when the algorithm terminates, vi(Aj) can be at most b more
than vi(Ai).
It is easy to see that the algorithm terminates in polynomial time. If no agent ever gets frozen, then the
algorithm terminates aer at most ⌈m/n⌉ rounds. Otherwise, let r be the first round in which an agent
gets frozen, i.e., there exists some agent j with vj(gj) = b and some agent i with vj(gi) = a. By the
definition of rj and Lemma 4.2, it follows that r = rj . Furthermore, again by Lemma 4.2, we know that
agent j did not get frozen in round r = rj (because vj(gj) = b), which means that she never gets frozen.
Since j gets a good in every round, the algorithm terminates aer at mostm rounds.
Let us now show that the algorithm constructs an EFX0 allocation. If some agent i has value b for all
goods, then by the argument in the proof of Lemma 4.3, agent i will be EFX0 at the end of the algorithm.
If there is at least one good which i values as a, then ri is well-defined. Recall that by Lemma 4.2, it holds
that agent i is allocated a good she values as a in each of the rounds 1, 2, . . . , ri − 1. In round ri there are
two cases:
Case I: Agent i is allocated a good she values as a. en, at the end of round ri, agent i has total value ari for
her bundle and total value at most ari for the bundle of any other agent. If agent i did not become frozen
at the end of round ri (which means she never will), then she will be EFX0 towards all agents at the end
of the algorithm by Lemma 4.3. Now consider the case where agent i froze at the end of round ri.
• Any agent j who obtained a good that i values as a in round ri will also freeze at the end of round
ri (by the definition of the set F of frozen agents), and both i and j will re-enter in the same round
later. us, since i is envy-free towards j up until round ri and both agents will never freeze again,
i will be EFX0 towards j at the end of the algorithm by Lemma 4.3.
• For any agent j who obtained a good that i values as b, the value of i for the bundle of j at the
end of round ri is at most a(ri − 1) + b. Hence, when agent i re-enters (aer the end of round
ri+ ⌊a/b−1⌋), her value for j’s bundle can be at most a(ri−1)+ b+ b⌊a/b−1⌋ ≤ ari. us, agent
i will be envy-free towards agent j at this point, and EFX0 towards j at the end of the algorithm by
Lemma 4.3. If the algorithm terminates before agent i re-enters (which could happen if b = 0), then
agent i is envy-free towards j.
Case II: Agent i is allocated a good she values as b. At the end of round ri her total value is a(ri − 1) + b,
and will never freeze by Lemma 4.2.
• For any agent j who obtained a good that i values as b in round ri, the value of i for j’s bundle can
be at most a(ri − 1) + b. us, agent i is envy-free towards j at the end of ri, and EFX0 at the end
of the algorithm by Lemma 4.3.
• Any agent j who obtained a good that i values as a in round ri must have frozen at the end of round
ri. If the algorithm terminates before agent j re-enters (for example, if b = 0), then agent i is EFX0
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with respect to j, because the value of i for j’s bundle is at most ari and the least valuable good from
i’s perspective is of value a. Otherwise, agent j re-enters before the termination of the algorithm
aer the end of round ri+ ⌊a/b−1⌋, and the value of i for j’s bundle is still at most ari, as j did not
receive any other good. Since i’s own value increased to a(ri − 1) + b+ b⌊a/b− 1⌋ > ari − b, her
envy towards agent j is at most b at this point. Furthermore, i has value b for the remaining goods.
Because in the last round we prioritize agents who have never goen frozen (which means that if
there are less goods than agents, i has priority in geing an available good compared to j), by an
argument similar to the one used in the proof of Lemma 4.3, it follows that the envy will still be at
most b at the end of the algorithm.
is completes the proof.
4.2 Interval-value instances
From our discussion thus far, it may seem like the difficultly of proving the existence of EFX0 allocations
is directly related to the number of different values that the agents have, but this is not entirely true. We
will now show that the range between the lowest and the highest value also plays a very important role:
for specific ranges, and independently of the number of values therein (which can be infinite), computing
EFX allocations can be achieved by very simple algorithms. In particular, we show that EFX allocations
exist for interval-instances in which the values of each agent i are in some interval [xi, 2xi], xi ∈ R>0, by
using a simple modification of the round-robin algorithm.
According to this algorithm, we fix an ordering of the agents and then they simply pick their favorite
unallocated good one by one, with respect to that ordering. is continues in rounds of n goods each,
until we reach a point where there are not enough goods for everyone. For this last round (if it exists), the
agents pick in reverse order (see Algorithm 2).
Algorithm 2 Modified round-robin
1: Input: Instance withm = kn+ ℓ, k ≥ 0, 0 ≤ ℓ < n
2: S = M
3: for r = 1, . . . , k do
4: for i = 1, . . . , n do
5: g ∈ argmaxq∈S vi(q)
6: Ai = Ai ∪ {g}
7: S = S \ {g}
8: for i = n, . . . , n− ℓ+ 1 do
9: g ∈ argmaxq∈S vi(q)
10: Ai = Ai ∪ {g}
11: S = S \ {g}
12: returnA = (A1, . . . , An)
eorem 4.4. Given an interval-instance in which the values of agent i are in the interval [xi, 2xi], xi ∈ R>0,
Modified round-robin computes an EFX allocation in polynomial time.
Proof. LetA = (A1, . . . , An) be the allocation produced by Algorithm 2. First observe that ifm < n then
the statement holds trivially. Hence, we assume thatm = kn + ℓ for some k ≥ 1 and 0 ≤ ℓ < n. In this
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case, the first n − ℓ agents will get k goods and the last ℓ agents will get k + 1 goods. Consider now an
agent i and let gir be the good that she gets in round 1 ≤ r ≤ k+1. We will show that i is EFX towards any
other agent j, by distinguishing between cases depending on whether i selects before or aer j according
to the main ordering of the algorithm.
Case I: i < j. Agent j either has the same number of goods as i, or one more good than i.
• If both agents get k goods, since i always chooses her most-valuable good before j, we have that
vi(gir) ≥ vi(gjr) for every r ∈ [k], and thus i does not envy j.
• If both agents get k+1 goods or agent i has k goods and agent j has k+1 goods, let gjt ∈ Aj be the
least-valuable good according to agent i, which j gets during round t ∈ [k + 1]. If t = k + 1, then
since vi(gir) ≥ vi(gjr) for every r ∈ [k], we immediately obtain that vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj \ {gi,k+1}). If
t ≤ k, since vi(git) ≥ vi(gi,k+1) and vi(gir) ≥ vi(gjr) for every r ∈ [k] \ {t}, we again obtain that
vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj \ {git}).
Case II: i > j. Agent j has either the same number of goods as i or one less good than i. Once again,
let gjt ∈ Aj be the least-valuable good according to agent i. Now observe that in general we have that
vi(gir) ≥ vi(gj,r+1) for every r ∈ [k − 1]. If t = 1, then the statement holds trivially. So, we assume that
t ≥ 2.
• If agent j gets k goods, then we have that vi(gir) ≥ vi(gj,r+1) for every 1 ≤ r ≤ t − 2 and
vi(gir) ≥ vi(gj,r+2) for every t − 1 ≤ r ≤ k − 2. So far we have bounded all goods in Aj \ {git}
besides gj1, using all goods in Ai besides gi,k−1 and gi,k (and also gi,k+1 if it exists). Since all the
values lie in the interval [xi, 2xi], we have that vi({gik−1)+ vi(gik}) ≥ vi({gj1}), which yields that
vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj \ {git}).
• If both agents get k + 1 goods, then we have that vi(gir) ≥ vi(gj,r+1) for every 1 ≤ r ≤ t − 2
and vi(gir) ≥ vi(gj,r+2) for every t− 1 ≤ r ≤ k − 1. Again, the values of the goods in Aj \ {git}
besides gj1 have been bounded by the values of the goods in Ai besides gik and gi,k+1. Since all
the values lie in the interval [xi, 2xi], we have that vi({gik) + vi(gi,k+1}) ≥ vi({gj1}), and thus
vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj \ {git}).
is completes the proof.
5 MNW and the EFX-value
As we saw in Section 3, maximizing the Nash welfare does not yield an EFX allocation in general. Here
we take a different route and instead of considering exact EFX allocations, we focus on approximation. We
start by showcasing that maximizing the Nash welfare does not guarantee any meaningful approximation
of EFX according to the current definition of approximation used in the literature [Plaut and Roughgarden,
2018; Amanatidis et al., 2018, 2020; Chan et al., 2019].
Definition 5.1 (α-EFX allocation). For α ∈ (0, 1], an allocationA is α-EFX if for every pair i, j ∈ N and
every good g ∈ Aj such that vi(g) > 0, it holds that vi(Ai) ≥ αvi(Aj \ {g}).
Let w > 1 and ε < 12w . Consider the following very simple instance with two agents, three goods, and
values given in the table:
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g1 g2 g3
agent 1 w 0 1/2
agent 2 w 1 ε
We first claim that the allocation A∗ = (A1 = {g1, g3}, A2 = {g2}) is the only one that achieves the
maximum Nash welfare of w + 1/2. Indeed, the Nash welfare of any allocation that gives g2 to agent 1
can only increase by moving g2 to agent 2, while any allocation other than A
∗ that gives g2 to agent 2
has Nash welfare either (w + 1)/2 or w + εw < w + 1/2. Notice, however, that A∗ is not EFX since
v2(A2) = 1 < w = v2(A1 \ {g3}). Instead, it is only 1/w-EFX, an approximation factor that can be
arbitrarily close to zero as w becomes large.
Nevertheless,A∗ is not that far away from being an EFX allocation! To see this, consider the allocation
B = (B1 = {g1}, B2 = {g2, g3}) that is obtained from A∗ by only moving g3 from agent 1 to agent 2.
Clearly, agent 2 is EFX towards agent 1, as the laer gets only one good. Moreover, the value agent 2 has
now is v2(B2) = 1 + ε, which is extremely close to the value v2(A2) = 1 that agent 2 has in A
∗. So,
even though A∗ is 1/w-EFX because v2(A2) is very low compared to v2(A1 \ {g3}), v2(A2) is actually
very close to the value she would have in a nearby EFX allocation. Consequently, if we accept that agent
2 considers the EFX allocationB as fair, then she should also considerA∗ as being almost fair.
We say that the value v2(B2) = 1 + ε is the EFX-value that agent 2 can achieve by augmenting her
bundle with a subset of goods from agent 1 in order to create the closest-to-A∗ (in terms of value) allocation
B which she considers as EFX. en, since v2(A2) =
1
1+εv2(B2), agent 2 achieves an approximation of
1
1+ε of her EFX-value. Let us now formalize these notions for any number of agents.
Definition 5.2 (EFX-value). Let A = (A1, . . . , An) be an allocation. For every pair of agents i, j ∈ N ,
letXij ⊆ Aj be a set of goods such that vi(Ai ∪Xij) ≥ vi(Aj \ (Xij ∪ {g})) for every g ∈ Aj \Xij and
vi(Ai ∪Xij) is minimized. en, the EFX-value of agent i is
χi(A) = max
j∈N\{i}
vi(Ai ∪Xij).
Definition 5.3 (α-vEFX allocation). For α ∈ (0, 1], an allocation A is α-vEFX if vi(Ai) ≥ αχi(A) for
every i ∈ N .
We remark that using EFX0 instead of EFX in the above definitions does not make any difference since
adding zeros does not affect the EFX-value. Furthermore, observe that a 1-vEFX allocation is an EFX
allocation but not necessarily an EFX0 allocation.
Our first technical result in this section illustrates the connection between approximate EFX and vEFX
allocations.
eorem 5.4. For α ∈ (0, 1), an α-EFX allocation is also an α1+α -vEFX allocation and this guarantee is
tight. On the other hand, an α-vEFX allocation is not guaranteed to be β-EFX, for any α, β ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. Let A be an α-EFX allocation such that vi(Ai) ≥ α · vi(Aj \ {g}), where vi(g) ∈ minq∈Aj vi(q),
for every pair of agents i, j ∈ N . We can equivalently write this inequality as (1 + α)vi(Ai) ≥ α(vi(Ai)
+ vi(Aj \ {g}), and since χi(A) ≤ vi(Ai ∪Aj \ {g}), we obtain that
vi(Ai)
χi(A)
≥ vi(Ai)
vi(Ai ∪Aj \ {g}) ≥
α
1 + α
.
Furthermore, by moving all goods inAj \{g} from j to i, we obtain an allocation in which j gets only one
good, and consequently i is EFX towards j. Hence,A is indeed αα+1 -vEFX.
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For the upper bound, let α ∈ (0, 1) and consider an instance in which some agent i has values given
by the following table:
g1 g2 g3
agent i 1 1/α 1/α
In the allocation A according to which Ai = {g1} and Aj = {g2, g3} for some agent j 6= i, agent i is
not EFX towards agent j. Since vi(Ai) = 1 and vi(Aj \ {g2}) = 1/α, we have that A is α-EFX. Now, by
moving g2 from j to i, i becomes EFX towards j, and achieves a total value of vi(Ai) + vi(g2) = 1+ 1/α,
yielding an approximation of 11/α+1 =
α
1+α on her EFX-value.
For the reverse relation, let α ∈ (0, 1) and γ > 1−αα . Consider an instance in which the values of some
agent i are:
g1 g2 g3
agent i 1 γ (1− α)/α
Let A be the allocation according to which Ai = {g1} and Aj = {g2, g3} for some agent j 6= i. Since
vi(Ai) = 1, agent i can become EFX towards j, by acquiring g3, in which case she achieves a value of 1/α.
Hence, A is α-vEFX. However, since vi(Aj \ {g3}) = γ, A is only 1/γ-EFX; the approximation can be
arbitrarily close to 0 as γ becomes large.
Even though maximizing the Nash welfare may not yield a β-EFX for any β ∈ (0, 1) as we showed
above, it is guaranteed to produce a constant vEFX allocation.
eorem 5.5. Any maximum Nash welfare allocation A∗ is 1/2-vEFX, and this bound is tight.
By using arguments similar to those in the proof of eorem 5.4, we can show that any EF1 allocation
is 1/2-vEFX. en, eorem 5.5 follows from the result of Caragiannis et al. [2019b] about MNW implying
EF1. Below, we present a direct and self-contained proof of eorem 5.5.
Proof. Consider a pair of agents i and j. Let Ai = {a1, ..., a|Ai|} and Aj = {b1, ..., b|Aj |} be the sets of
goods allocated to i and j according to A∗, respectively. Without loss of generality, we may assume that
0 ≤ vi(b1) ≤ ... ≤ vi(b|Aj |). Let S = {b1, ..., bλ}, λ < |Aj | be the subset of least-valued goods of Aj such
that i is EFX towards j when given the set S (on top of Ai), but is not EFX towards j when given only the
set S \{bλ}. We are going to show that vi(Ai) ≥ vi(S)⇔ 2vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Ai ∪S). If this is true, then since
χi(A) ≤ vi(Ai ∪ S), A∗ must be 1/2-vEFX.
Assume towards a contradiction that vi(Ai) < vi(S). By its definition, S is such that
vi(Ai) + vi(S \ {bλ}) < vi(Aj \ (S \ {bλ}))− vi(bλ)
or, equivalently,
vi(Ai) + vi(S \ {bλ}) < vi(Aj \ S).
Also vi(S \ {bλ}) ≥ 0 implies that vi(Ai) < vi(Aj \ S). Since vj(S) + vj(Aj \ S) = vj(Aj), it must be
the case that one of vj(S) and vj(Aj \ S) is at least vj(Aj)2 , while the other is at most this much.
• If vj(S) ≤ vj(Aj)2 and vj(Aj \ S) ≥
vj(Aj)
2 , then we define a new allocation in which all goods in S
are moved from agent j to agent i. By our assumption that vi(Ai) < vi(S), the product of the new
values of the two agents is
(
vi(Ai) + vi(S)
) · vj(Aj \ S) > 2vi(Ai) · vj(Aj)
2
= vi(Ai) · vj(Aj).
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Since the sets of goods given to the other agents have not been altered, the new allocation has strictly
more Nash welfare thanA∗, a contradiction.
• If vj(S) ≥ vj(Aj)2 and vj(Aj \ S) ≤
vj(Aj)
2 , then we define another allocation in which all goods in
Aj \ S are moved from j to i. Since vi(Ai) < vi(Aj \ S), the product of the new values of the two
agents becomes
(
vi(Ai) + vi(Aj \ S)
) · vj(S) > 2vi(Ai) · vj(Aj)
2
= vi(Ai) · vj(Aj),
again yielding a contradiction.
Consequently, it must be vi(Ai) ≥ vi(S), meaning thatA∗ is 1/2-vEFX.
For the upper bound, consider again the instance used in Section 3 to show that an MNW allocation
may not be EFX for 3-value instances. For ease of reference, we repeat the table containing the values of
the two agents for the three goods here:
g1 g2 g3
agent 1 1− ε 1 1 + ε
agent 2 1 1− ε 1 + ε
As we argued in Section 3, the allocationsA1 = ({g2, g3}, {g1}) and A2 = ({g2}, {g1, g3}) are the only
Nashwelfaremaximizing ones. Both of these are 12−ε -vEFX since the envious agent can get the least-valued
good from the other agent (worth 1− ε) and become EFX.
6 Directions for Future Work
We studied the connection between two celebrated notions, that of maximum Nash welfare and envy-
freeness up to any good. We showed that a maximum Nash welfare allocation is always EFX0 for 2-value
instances, while this implication is no longer true for k-value instances with k ≥ 3. e first question that
our work leaves open is whether it is possible to compute in polynomial-time an allocation that maximizes
the Nash welfare for 2-value instances.
Nevertheless, for 2-value instances we presented a polynomial-time algorithm for computing an EFX0
allocation. Due to its novelty, we believe that the idea of repeatedly computing maximum matchings and
freezing certain agents whenever they acquire too much value (compared to other agents), might be a
stepping stone for proving the existence of EFX0 more generally. at being said, while generalizing our
algorithm to k-value instances with k ≥ 3 definitely deserves further investigation, it does seem to be a
highly non-trivial task.
Finally, going beyond exact MNW or EFX allocations, we discussed the connection between MNW
and approximate EFX allocations. While an MNW allocation does not necessarily provide any meaningful
guarantee according to the commonly used definition of approximation, we showed that it does under
a new interpretation of approximation via the EFX-value. A natural question is whether one can design
polynomial-time algorithms with strong approximation guarantees for both the EFX-value and the Nash
welfare.
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